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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of “safe space” for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (“LGBTQ”) young people is commonly associated with the
responsibility of primary and secondary school educators to create safe
havens for LGBTQ students from their age peers, by establishing educatorenforced space for dialogue and accountability around name-calling,
bullying, and other forms of abuse.1 The term is also applied in child
welfare and juvenile justice reform efforts, particularly in the development
of safer placement and housing classification protocols, as well as and in
sensitizing youth-serving professionals to the needs of LGBTQ young
people.2
Yet “safe spaces” reform efforts have failed to advance best practice
guidelines for youth-serving professionals to ensure safety for LGBTQ
youth from one of the primary perpetrators of violence and harassment
against them: law enforcement. The oversight is a glaring one, given the
wildly disproportionate rate of police encounters, arrest, secure
confinement, and institutional placement faced by LGBTQ youth. Roughly
300,000 gay and transgender youth are arrested or detained each year in the

1. GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE SAFE SPACE KIT: A GUIDE
TO SUPPORTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN YOUR
SCHOOL 2 (2003) [hereinafter GLSEN], (noting that LGBTQ youth with supportive

educators feel safer at school, skip fewer classes, and earn higher grades than students
without supportive educators).
2. See id; see also SHANNAN WILBER, CAITLIN RYAN & JODY MARKSAMER,
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CWLA BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES: SERVING LGBT
YOUTH IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE 41 (2006),
http://www.nclrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/bestpracticeslgbtyouth.pdf [hereinafter CWLA].
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United States.3 Sixty percent of these youth are Black and/or Latino/a.4
While LGBTQ youth represent 4-8% of young people in the United States,
they make up as many as 13% of those currently in detention.5
The act of arrest is never just ink on a R.A.P. sheet for LGBTQ youth. It
exposes youth to police encounters with a high incidence of discriminatory
profiling, false arrest, illegal search, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, and
physical brutality.6 These youth are in fact much more likely to be verbally
and physically assaulted by the police than their heterosexual age peers,
and over twice as likely to report sexual misconduct by police in the prior
six months.7 This gratuitous violence is paired with the reality that LGB
and gender non-conforming youth are twice as likely to be held in secure
detention for truancy, warrants, probation violations, running away,
prostitution, and are more likely than heterosexual youth to face detention
for non-violent offenses.8 Those young people who avoid detention face
multiple court appearances, fines and surcharges, and intensive
probationary supervision, often in institutional placements.9 After court
3. JEROME HUNT & AISHA C. MOODIE-MILLS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE
UNFAIR CRIMINALIZATION OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
EXPERIENCE OF LGBT YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2012),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/juvenile_justice.pdf (drawing figures from the 2011
estimate of the National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Coalition that 2.1
million youth per year are arrested in the United States).
4. HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 3, at 1.
5. KATAYOON MAJD, JODY MARKSAMER & CAROLYN REYES, THE EQUITY
PROJECT, HIDDEN INJUSTICE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN
JUVENILE
COURTS
1
(2009),
http://www.equityproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/hidden_injustice.pdf (citing Angela Irvine, Ceres Policy Res.,
The Inappropriate Use of Secure Detention for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
and Queer (LGBTQ) Youth, Presentation at the Columbia University Gender on the
Frontiers Symposium, [April 10, 2009]).
6. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND
MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE
U.S. 1 (2005) (extensively documenting discriminatory profiling and selective
enforcement perpetrated against LGBT people by law enforcement personnel, as well
as sexual, physical and verbal abuse; illegal searches to determine genital status of
transgender arrestees; and lack of transgender-specific policies, procedures, and
training).
7. Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine & Medline Fox, Growing up Policed in the Age
of Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1331, 1370 app. IX (2011).
8. Angela Irvine, We’ve Had Three of Them: Addressing the Invisibility of
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Gender Non-Conforming Youths in the Juvenile Justice
System, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 675, 693 (2010).
9. “Institutionalization” is “[t]he practice of placing children or youth in
hospitals, residential treatment, institutions, or orphanages. Institutionalization has been
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supervision is lifted, youth face life-limiting collateral consequences; a
single criminal conviction can result in restricted access to housing,
eviction, denial of public benefits including educational loans, exclusion
from professions, and even deportation.10
Society’s emerging awareness of LGBTQ youth homelessness has
caused the proliferation of both congregate and alternative care options
such as drop-in centers, transitional housing, and permanent supportive
housing. As street-involved young people seek shelter and community
indoors, the police have followed suit, increasingly targeting these spaces
with warrant enforcement units and unannounced searches with insufficient
probable cause, let alone valid warrants, in which officers sometimes
threaten staff who object to the legality of the entry or arrest with arrest
itself for non-compliance. The threat of conflict with local precincts
combines with a scarcity of shelter options to internalize a policing
mentality among social service organizations themselves. Efforts to
“rightsize” congregate care are incremental at best.11 These reforms do not
carry an equal emphasis on increasing permanent and independent housing
options. 12
This mentality effectively deputizes youth-serving professionals as
enforcers of a strict regime of exclusionary and restrictive policies designed
to separate the “deserving” or high-functioning youth from those youth
who are deemed non-deserving. A culture of rules is built up in these
programs which conditions continued receipt of services on perceived good
behavior, compliance with time-based bathroom limits, curfews, restrictive
associated with developmental delays due to environmental deprivation, poor staffchild ratios, lack of contact with normal societal learning situations, or lack of a
consistent caregiver. The term may also be used to describe the damage caused to
people so accustomed to life in an institution that they have difficulties assuming or
resuming life outside the institution.” Child Welfare Information Gateway—Glossary I,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/glossary/glossarya/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015)
[hereinafter HHS].
10. See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, AM. BAR
ASS’N CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ (last visited
Dec. 1, 2015) [hereinafter ABA–CJS]; see also The Collateral Consequences
Calculator–New York State, Columbia Law SCH., calculator.law.columbia.edu/about/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
11. See generally ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., RIGHTSIZING CONGREGATE CARE: A
POWERFUL FIRST STEP IN TRANSFORMING CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS (2012),
http://www.aecf.org/resources/rightsizing-congregate-care/.
12. LAURA E. DURSO & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SERVING OUR YOUTH:
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS WORKING WITH LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH WHO ARE HOMELESS OR AT RISK OF
BECOMING HOMELESS 10 (2012).
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guest and visitation policies, and milestones tied to income or employment
that are often impossible to reach for youth who face employment
discrimination, whether due to their race, gender identity, or record of
convictions. A sad irony is that not only does this trend contribute to the
push out of young people with the greatest need for support, but it also
diminishes the life chances of those young people who manage to remain
enrolled. The relative restrictiveness of placement settings has been found
to significantly affect educational outcomes in the child welfare context.
Roughly two-thirds of youth in foster family-based placements or
transitional apartments attend post-secondary education, while only onethird of youth in moderate to highly restrictive settings such as residential
treatment facilities and group homes do so.13
The disproportionate state-involvement of LGBTQ youth, and in
particular LGBTQ youth of color, is therefore well established as a
contemporary social problem. But what explains the omission of law
enforcement violence from the “safe spaces” reform agenda? In her
manuscript Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of
Violence, Christina B. Hanhardt offers a convincing social-historical
explanation using archival and ethnographic research into the term’s
deployment by gay and lesbian activists in New York and San Francisco
from the 1960s to the early 2000s.14 While the stated objective of these gay
and lesbian activists was to enhance police protection to end street
harassment and violence, Harnhardt situates the activists’ efforts to achieve
“safety” in the context of neoliberalism, gentrification, and the escalating
policing and surveillance of LGBTQ low-income people of color.15
Harnhardt’s analysis tests the limits of “safe space” reform efforts,
namely that any space can be truly safe for youth living at the edge of
survival whose very existence is criminalized. The irony of a movement
for “safe spaces” that does not account for law enforcement violence is
readily apparent when considering the riots credited with launching the
LGBTQ movement for liberation.16 The foundational uprisings of the
13. E.V. Mech & C. Che-man Fung, Placement Restrictiveness and Educational
Achievement Among Emancipated Foster Youth, 9 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 213, 222-23
(1999).
14. See generally CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD
HISTORY AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE (2013).
15. Id. at 13-15.
16. Id. at 4-7. Note also the earlier small-scale riot in 1959 at Cooper’s Donuts in
Los Angeles, when street queens and hustlers who hung out at Cooper’s Donuts fought
back after the L.A.P.D. arrested three people, including John Rechy, the Chicano
novelist and author of the hustler memoir City of Night (1963). The patrons of Cooper’s
Donuts pelted police with donuts and coffee cups to free the three arrestees, although
the L.A.P.D. would eventually arrest a number of rioters. See LILLIAN FADERMAN &
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contemporary LGBTQ movement were initiated, organized, and
accomplished by LGBT people of color. The Compton’s Cafeteria Riot of
August 1966 in San Francisco’s Tenderloin neighborhood was started by
transgender and gender non-conforming people of color in response to the
efforts of Compton’s staff to summon the police to disperse and arrest
“cross-dressers.”17 When a police officer attempted to restrain one patron,
she threw a cup of coffee into the officer’s face and other Compton’s
patrons followed suit with dishes and furniture, breaking a window,
lighting a newsstand on fire, and destroying a police car.18 The following
night the militant LGBTQ runaway and homeless youth activists of
Vanguard and Street Orphans picketed the cafeteria.19 Just three years
later, the Stonewall Inn riots of June 28, 1969, also erupted in response to
police violence, specifically an early morning raid at the Stonewall Inn in
which police brutalized and arrested patrons by using anatomical
“searches” of transgender, gender non-conforming, and other bar patrons to
identify and charge patrons for so-called “cross-dressing.”20 That night,
Stonewall Inn patrons, street queens, hustlers, and the homeless youth who
resided in Christopher Park responded to the raid by resisting arrest and
attempting to free the thirteen arrestees using thrown coins, garbage, glass,
fire, bricks, cobblestones, and a battering ram once the police on the scene
retreated into the Stonewall Inn.21 The Stonewall riots set off months of
protests in the village to protest discriminatory policing and establish “safe
spaces” for LGBTQ people to gather without fear of arrest.22
This history has been largely forgotten, or perhaps intentionally erased,
in the present-day. On December 10, 2015, United States Senator Kristen
Gillibrand, Senator Chuck Schumer, and United States Representative
Jerrold Nadler introduced legislation to create the Stonewall National
Historic Site as a unit of the National Park System.23 The stated purpose of

STUART TIMMONS, GAY L.A.: A HISTORY OF SEXUAL OUTLAWS, POWER POLITICS, AND
LIPSTICK LESBIANS 1-2 (2006).
17. See generally Screaming Queens: The Riot at Compton’s Cafeteria
(documentary film by Victor Silverman & Susan Stryker, 2005).
18. Joe Dignan, Recalling a San Francisco Stonewall: Drag Queens Fought Back
at a Tenderloin Coffee Shop in 1966, GAY CITY NEWS, vol. 5, no. 26, June 29-July 5,
2006, gaycitynews.nyc/gcn_526/recallingasanfrancisco.html.
19. Id.
20. See generally DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE
GAY REVOLUTION (2010).
21. Id. at 160.
22. Id. at 182-94.
23. Stonewall National Historic Site Establishment Act of 2015, H.R. 4230 &
S.2386, 114th Cong. (2015).
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the legislation is, in part, to “to enhance understanding of . . . the
discrimination against LGBT individuals that led to the Stonewall uprising;
and . . . the ongoing struggle to achieve civil rights.”24 The legislation
contains no reference to police violence.
The willful blindness of contemporary “safe spaces” reformists to state
violence and racialized poverty may also be due in part to the knowledge
gap between high-level policy advocates and staff providing direct services
to runaway, homeless, and unstably housed youth. Among youth-serving
professionals in New York City, the reality is increasingly harder to ignore.
Without reform, this trend threatens to enlist youth-serving professionals in
contributing to the ever-increasing number of state-involved LGBTQ youth
of color.
This Article provides guidance to youth-serving professionals to assist
social service organizations in mitigating the disproportionate policing and
criminalization of LGBTQ youth of color. Part I offers background on the
disproportionate policing and state-involvement of LGBTQ youth,
primarily LGBTQ youth of color.
Part II surveys the type and
characteristics of social service settings in which youth find themselves,
whether voluntarily or as the result of a court mandate. Part III analyzes
legal standards applicable to arrest and search warrants, as well as relevant
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in the context of
social service settings. This section integrates recommendations for youthserving professionals seeking to minimize police entry and protect the
Fourth Amendment rights of clients, including police incident reporting,
staff escort policies and mediation of client grievances. While the
guidelines contained in this Article offer better protection for young people,
they also present the potential benefit of minimizing liability for
professional misconduct by social service personnel and organizational
liability. Part IV provides guidance to youth-serving professionals who
may face a risk of committing professional malpractice through falsely
reporting crimes or breaching confidentiality when involving third parties
such as security guards or law enforcement. The Article concludes by
urging youth-serving professionals to adopt policies and practices designed
to minimize police involvement in their programs, to close off this rapidly
emerging pathway into the criminal legal system for LGBTQ youth of
color.

24. Id. § 2-b. See also Hanna Trudo, N.Y. Lawmakers Seek to Honor Gay Rights
Landmark, POLITICO, Sept. 20, 2015, www.politico.com/story/2015/09/stoneweall-gayrights-nadler-gillibrand-213865.
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II. VULNERABILITY TO SYSTEMS INVOLVEMENT
The overrepresentation of LGBTQ youth in arrest and court statistics is
well established. Drawing from the 2011 estimate of the National Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Coalition in combination with other
research, one study estimated that 300,000 LGBTQ youth arrested or
detained annually nationwide, 60% of whom are Black and/or Latino/a.25
While LGBTQ youth represent just 4-8% of the nation’s overall youth
population, they make up as many as 13% of those currently in detention.26
The pipelining of LGBTQ youth into the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems is driven by a variety of factors: homelessness, failing
social safety nets, biased school discipline policies, and family rejection are
each commonly cited as influential. Yet these explanations merely set the
stage for youth to be exposed to frequent police contact due to housing
instability or street-based homelessness. This Article argues in the
alternative that these youths’ disproportionate state involvement has a
primary cause: racially and sexually discriminatory practices in law
enforcement, as well as family, juvenile, and criminal court systems. For
each young person subjected to this systemic bias, there follows lifelong
consequences, but for many youth, the consequences are far more
imminent. LGBTQ youth are at risk of classification as sex offenders upon
entry; institutionalization by default where they lack accepting familybased placement options; segregation and isolation of gay and transgender
youth in custody; physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by staff and other
youth; unsafe “reparative” or conversion therapy; and increasingly
restrictive placement settings.27 There is however an opportunity to
interrupt this escalating sequence of consequences, and that is by mitigating
or eliminating the triggering event itself. It is decidedly the professional
responsibility of youth-serving professionals to stand by the side of the
runaway and homeless youth they have sworn to support and protect, the
very moment when that same young person is confronted with a situation
critical to their lives for decades to come.
A. Law Enforcement Contact
LGBTQ people of all ages face a disturbingly high incidence of police
contact, discriminatory profiling, false arrest, police harassment, and other
forms of violence. The body of research documenting violence that
LGBTQ communities experience in the legal system—whether through the
prism of victim, suspect, arrestee, defendant, or convicted person—has
25.
26.
27.

See HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 3, at 1.
See MAJD, MARKSAMER & REYES, supra note 5, at 44.
See generally HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 3.
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been cited in support of advocates’ claims that law enforcement officers,
court personnel, and corrections officers view non-normative sexual
orientation or gender identity as inherently criminal, and that the policing
of sex and gender reinforces racial and gender inequalities.28
In a national survey of 2,300 LGBTQ people and people living with
HIV, 25% of respondents with any recent police contact reported at least
one type of misconduct or harassment, such as: being accused of an offense
they did not commit, verbal assault, being arrested for an offense they did
not commit, sexual harassment, physical assault, or sexual assault.29
Respondents who were of color, low-income, and/or transgender were
much more likely to report an experience of at least one type of misconduct
or harassment.30 Another survey of LGBT people and people living with
HIV who had encounters with police, courts, prison, and security found
that 25% of respondents with any recent police contact reported at least one
type of misconduct or harassment, such as: being accused of an offense
they did not commit, verbal assault, being arrested for an offense they did
not commit, sexual harassment, physical assault, and sexual assault.31
Transgender and gender non-conforming people are particularly vulnerable
to police harassment and abuse. The National Transgender Discrimination
Survey found that 22% of transgender people who interacted with police
report harassment, 6% report physical assault, and 2% report sexual assault
by police officers.32
The situation facing LGBTQ youth is especially fraught, as adolescents
and young adults have long faced disproportionate policing and
criminalization. Criminologists have long noted that “[t]he relationship
between offending and age is bell-shaped, and the prevalence of offending
tends to increase from late childhood, peaks in the teenage years (around
ages fifteen to nineteen), and then declines in the early twenties.”33 While
many putative explanations based on developmental psychology, brain
28. See generally JOEY L. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER
(IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011).
29. LAMBDA LEGAL, PROTECTED AND SERVED? SURVEY OF LGBT/HIV CONTACT
WITH
POLICE,
COURTS,
PRISONS,
AND
SECURITY
8-13
(2014),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/ps_executive-summary.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & NAT’L
GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY
6
(2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
33. ROLF LOEBER & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO
YOUNG
ADULT
OFFENDING
1,
3
(2013),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf.
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science, and the like have been introduced, the age-crime curve is more
meaningfully explained as a reflection of patterns of age-stratified
inequality, particularly as mediated by race or ethnicity.34 The United
States Census Bureau found that in 2013, 19.9% of persons ages seventeen
years-old and under (14.7 million) lived in poverty, compared to 13.6% of
people eighteen to sixty-four (26.4 million), and 9.5% of people sixty-five
and older (4.2 million).35 It also found that in 2013, 27.2% of Black people
live in poverty compared to 23.5% of people described as Hispanic whites,
10.5% of people of Asian descent, and merely 9.6% of non-Hispanic
whites in 2013.36
LGBTQ youth face compound criminalization, involving their age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, and race or ethnicity.37 This proposition
is borne out by the wealth of social science research on the subject.
Drawing from a national, population-based sample, one study found that
LGBTQ youth are more likely to be stopped by the police and have a 1.25
to 3 times greater probability of experiencing sanctions than their
heterosexual counterparts, even when controlling for engagement in
transgressive behavior.38 Similarly, a study on the effect of stop-and-frisk
policies in New York City found that LGB youth are more likely to
experience negative verbal, physical, and legal contact with the police, over
twice as likely to experience sexual misconduct in the previous six months,
and tend to not feel as comfortable seeking out a police officer for help.39
Transgender youth report that police frequently profile them as being
engaged in prostitution, mock them, sexually harass and assault them, and
conduct unlawful strip “searches” to assign them a gender based on
anatomical features.40
These figures are especially troubling in the context of New York State’s

34. Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship:
Social Variation, Social Explanations, THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN
CRIMINOLOGY: ON THE ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY 377, 394
(Kevin M. Beaver, J.C. Barnes, & Brian B. Boutwell eds., 2014).
35. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED
STATES:
2013
table
3,
13
(2014),
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.
36. Id.
37. See generally AMNESTY INT’L supra note 6.
38. Kathryn E. W. Himmelstein & Hannah Brückner, Criminal Justice and School
Sanctions Against Nonheterosexual Youth: A National Longitudinal Study, 127
PEDIATRICS 49, 49-57 (2011).
39. See Stoudt et al., supra note 7, at 1370 app. IX; see also HUNT & MOODIEMILLS, supra note 3, at 1.
40. MAJD, MARKSAMER & REYES, supra note 5, at 162-63.
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policy that youth ages sixteen and seventeen years old are prosecuted in
adult criminal court, regardless of the offense.41 For those young people
who are ages nineteen or above, or who are sixteen to eighteen years old,
but disqualified from Youthful Offender status as a result of a prior felony
offense, once court supervision is lifted, youth face life-limiting collateral
consequences; a criminal conviction can result in restriction of access to
housing, eviction, denial of public benefits including educational loans,
exclusion from professions, and even deportation.42
B. Juvenile Justice System Involvement
Given the particularly high incidence of police encounters, profiling,
false arrest, police harassment, and violence experienced by LGBTQ youth,
it is not surprising that these young people also make up a disproportionate
share of the juvenile justice system. Recent estimates of the percentage of
LGBTQ youth in detention range from 12-15%.43 Gay and transgender
youth are particularly at risk of being labeled sex offenders for consensual
sexual activity with other youth and of being treated as sex offenders
despite entering the justice system on unrelated charges.44
LGB and gender non-conforming youth are twice as likely to be held in
pre-trial detention—which is the temporary custody of a juvenile before
trial in a secure confinement facility45—for truancy, warrants, probation
violations, running away and prostitution; they are also more likely than
heterosexual youth to face pre-trial detention for non-violent offenses.46 In
one study, justice system personnel reported that LGBTQ youth often
experience pretrial detention on the biased assumption that they are
predatory or cannot be kept safe in the community; detention was also
relied on in cases where parents refused to assume custody of youth.47
These system-based observations are supported by data specific to youth
reached outside the justice system, such as through programs for runaway
and homeless youth. LGB homeless youth are significantly more likely
than non-LGB homeless youth to have been in jail or detention (33%24%), and transgender homeless youth are significantly more likely to have

41. CITIZENS CRIME COMM’N OF N.Y.C., GUIDE TO JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW
YORK CITY 4 (2010).
42. See generally ABA–CJS, supra note 10.
43. See generally Irvine, supra note 8.
44. HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 3, at 1-2.
45. Glossary,
JUVENILE
LAW
CTR.,
www.jlc.org/news-room/mediaresources/glossary (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
46. Irvine, supra note 8, at 693.
47. MAJD, MARKSAMER & REYES supra note 5, at 104-105.
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been in jail or detention (32%-25%).48
Whether placed in secure confinement as a result of a pre-trial detention
or final disposition, placing LGBTQ youth in a locked facility49 carries its
own risks. Once in detention, LGBTQ youth report higher rates of sexual
victimization by other youth.50
They also report incidents where
correctional personnel try to change their sexual orientation.51 Lack of
appropriate medical care for transgender youth in secure confinement has
been well documented.52 In secure confinement, LGBTQ youth are at risk
of inappropriate classification and housing. For example, transgender
youth can be housed based on their birth sex, which can be psychologically
traumatic.53 Facilities will sometimes segregate LGBTQ youth “for their
protection,” placing them in isolated areas or even in solitary confinement,
which can create distress and deprive youth of educational and recreational
opportunities.54
Even for cases that do not result in secure confinement, court
dispositions can include harmful outcomes for LGBTQ youth. Those
young people who avoid secure confinement may still face multiple court
appearances, fines and surcharges, and a high likelihood of a negative
disposition, leading to secure confinement or intensive probationary
supervision, often in institutional placements. Court supervision may
include mandates to undertake “therapy” or counseling to attempt to
change their sexual orientation or gender identity.55 Trauma and Post48. LANCE FREEMAN & DARRICK HAMILTON, EMPIRE STATE COAL. OF YOUTH AND
FAMILY SERVS, A COUNT OF HOMELESS YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY: 2007 22 (2008).
49. JUVENILE LAW CTR., supra note 45. Note that despite their potentially
restrictive conditions other out-of-home placements such as shelters, halfway houses,
or residential facilities are generally not considered secure confinement facilities. Id.
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY YOUTH
2012 20 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svjfry12.pdf.
51. MAJD, MARKSAMER & REYES, supra note 5, at 65.
52. Id. at 111-12.
53. See generally HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 3.
54. Id.
55. MAJD, MARKSAMER & REYES, supra note 5, at 64. A “disposition” is a
“[d]efinite action taken or treatment plan decided on or initiated regarding a particular
case after the judicial decision is made. In the juvenile delinquency context, a
disposition may include: transfer to criminal court, placement in a residential facility
for delinquents or otherwise placed in out-of-home care, probation or supervision, or
dismissal, including cases dismissed with no further action anticipated. A disposition
may also include a variety of other actions, such as fines, restitution and community
services, or referrals outside the court for services . . .” Statistical Briefing Book,
Glossary, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION [OJJDP], http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/glossary.html (last visited Dec. 1,
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Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are prevalent among juvenile detainees,
and justice system involvement has been shown to be associated with
“lower high school graduation rates, a higher risk of unemployment, and
increased future delinquency.”56
C. Child Welfare System Involvement
There is increasing evidence that LGBTQ youth are also overrepresented in the child welfare system. The Los Angeles Foster Youth
Survey found that 19.1% of the Los Angeles foster care youth population
ages twelve to twenty-one years are LGBTQ.57 The Midwest Evaluation of
the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth found 11% of foster care
youth were lesbian, gay, or bisexual.58 This observation tracks with
research showing that the proportion of runaway and homeless youth with
experience in foster care ranges between 21% to 53%.59 In one New York
City study, LGB homeless youth were found to be significantly more likely
to have been in foster care than non-LGB homeless youth (33%-27%).60
Once in the child welfare system, youth are at great risk of being brought
into the juvenile justice system. Among youth in secure confinement,
LGBTQ youth are almost twice as likely as heterosexual youth to have
lived in a foster or group home.61
It is also apparent that LGBTQ youth are more likely to be subject to an
institutional placement in a group home or residential treatment facility in
the child welfare system rather than a family-based placement. This is
particularly true for youth arrested on prostitution-related offenses. One
New York City study found that among a subgroup of youth aged fifteen
and under brought before Family Court for prostitution-related offenses
from 2004 to 2006, 90% of cases resulted in an admission or finding that
the acts were committed, while 10% were dismissed or withdrawn, and
2015).
56. MEREDITH DANK ET AL., URBAN INST., LOCKED IN: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
LGBTQ YOUTH, YMSM, YWSW WHO ENGAGE IN SURVIVAL SEX AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS 10 (2015).
57. BIANCA D. M. WILSON ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., SEXUAL AND GENDER
MINORITY YOUTH IN L. A. COUNTY FOSTER CARE: ASSESSING DISPROPORTIONALITY
AND DISPARITIES 26 (2014).
58. AMY DWORSKY, MATHEMATICA POLICY RES., THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF
LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL YOUTH TRANSITIONING OUT OF FOSTER CARE 2 (2013),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/opre_lgbt_brief_01_04_2013.pdf.
59. M.G. Haber & P. A. Toro, Homelessness Among Families, Children, and
Adolescents: An Ecological-Developmental Perspective, 7 CLINICAL CHILD & FAMILY
PSYCH. REV. 123, 130 (2004).
60. FREEMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 48, at 22.
61. Irvine, supra note 8, at 691.
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only one case resulted in an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.62
Among those cases reaching a final disposition, 62% resulted in
institutional placement.63 In contrast, among PINS cases generally, one
study found that only 12% resulted in a final disposition of foster care
placement, likely in foster homes.64
The disproportionalities evident in both the initiation of child welfare
involvement and the likelihood of institutional placement are especially
disturbing in light of findings as to the conditions of placement that
LGBTQ youth face. Researchers have found that LGBTQ youth in
residential treatment facilities, group homes, and shelters experience
harassment, discomfort, insensitivity, rejection, and feelings of isolation.65
In fact, some homeless LGBTQ youth report engaging in survival sex to
avoid the experience of violence and abuse in child welfare placements.66
These youth also suffer the burden of more restrictive placement settings,
which have been found to significantly affect educational outcomes;
roughly two-thirds of youth in foster family-based placements or
transitional apartments attend post-secondary education while only onethird of youth in moderate to highly restrictive settings such as residential
treatment facilities and group homes do so.67 The restrictive conditions
imposed by a given facility include a variety of limitations imposed on
freedom of movement, the extent to which rules and regulations are used as
a mechanism of controlling behavior, and limits established regarding
contact with normalizing community based environments outside the
placement setting, such as recreation and social relationships.68
In New York City, the Administration for Children’s Services is
responsible for the child welfare and juvenile justice systems in the city.
The agency has indicated that improving services for LGBTQ children,
youth, and families is a priority, according to its 2006 strategic plan.69
62.

AMY MUSLIM ET AL., THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
NEW YORK CITY, VOL. 2: FORMATIVE EVALUATION: THE NEW YORK CITY
DEMONSTRATION 17 (2008).
63. Id.
64. WEINGARTNER ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE PINS SYSTEM
IN NEW YORK CITY: RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 25 (2002).
65. NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST. & NAT’L
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH:
AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 83-89 (2006).
66. DANK, supra note 56, at 85-92.
67. See Mech & Fung, supra note 13, at 222-23.
68. See generally Mary E. Rauktis et al., Measuring the Restrictiveness of Living
Environments for Children and Youth: Reconceptualizing Restriction, 17 J. EMOTIONAL
& BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 147 (2009).
69. See generally N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., PROPOSED STRATEGIC
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Recently, the agency issued an official guide of policies and best practices
for serving transgender and gender-nonconforming children and youth in
the child welfare, detention, and juvenile justice systems and has multiple
official policies in place to address the needs of this population.70
However, service providers have criticized the slow pace and failure to
appropriately implement these policies with regard to staff discipline,
placement options, and agency priorities.71
III. SOCIAL SERVICE SETTINGS AVAILABLE TO LGBTQ YOUTH
Through heightened policing and involvement in juvenile justice and
child welfare systems, LGBTQ youth face institutional placement in group
homes and residential treatment facilities that carry their own risk of law
enforcement presence in these spaces. But there are also an increasing
number of congregate and alternative care options such as drop-in centers,
emergency shelter, transitional housing, and permanent supportive housing
that operate outside of the justice system. In both cases, as street-involved
young people seek shelter and community indoors or are placed into
institutions, the police have followed suit, increasingly targeting these
spaces with warrant enforcement units and unannounced, warrantless
searches often threatening staff with arrest for non-compliance.
This section describes the different care settings to inform Part III’s
discussion of the relevant Fourth Amendment standards that govern law
enforcement entry for the purposes of arrests and searches: covering
relevant circumstances such as accessibility by the public, entry
requirements for participants versus non-participants, security measures,
and the existence or non-existence of a lease.72 While this analysis focuses
on New York State, definitions are also sourced from the United States
Family and Youth Services Bureau, which administers Basic Center
Program and Transitional Living Program grants in many other states. In
this context it is important to note that some care settings are more
common—and serve far more youth—than others, making them

PLAN TO IMPROVE SERVICES TO LGBTQ YOUTH AT THE NEW YORK CITY
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (2006).
70. N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., PROMOTING A SAFE AND RESPECTFUL
ENVIRONMENT FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER AND QUESTIONING
(LGBTQ) YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES INVOLVED IN THE CHILD WELFARE, DETENTION
AND
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SYSTEM,
ACS
POLICY
N O.
2012/01,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/lgbtq/LGBTQ_Policy.pdf.
71. DANK, supra note 56, at 82-4.
72. See generally Douglas H. Lasdon, Beyond the Quagmire: The Fourth
Amendment Rights of Residents of Private Shelters for the Homeless, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 389 (1985-86).
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particularly vulnerable to policing targeting.
Still other programs
specifically tailored to LGBTQ youth are limited at best and rarely involve
independent living or supportive housing in an apartment. In a national
survey of service providers working with LGBTQ homeless youth, 50% of
respondents reported that their agencies offered transitional living services
and street outreach services, as well as having a drop-in-center, but far
fewer offered independent living (19%), permanent housing (10%), and
host home services (8%).73
A. Voluntary Social Service Settings
1. Youth Drop-In Centers
A youth drop-in center is a physical building where homeless youth can
rest and receive food, clothing, and have other basic needs met, as well as
access to counseling and referrals to relevant services. The Basic Center
Program administered by the United States Family & Youth Services
Bureau provides limited grants for drop-in centers to provide youth up to
age eighteen with food, clothing, counseling and referrals for health care—
as well as connection to emergency or crisis shelter as defined below.
Among all social service settings, a drop-in center is typically the least
restrictive, but still maintains procedures such as screening at intake to
determine client eligibility and front-door staff who monitor and restrict
entry by the general public.
In New York City, drop-in centers are open six days a week, open from
12 p.m. to 9 p.m., and are located in each of the five boroughs of New York
City—one per borough with the exception of Manhattan, which hosts
three.74 Starting in FY 2010, New York City contracts required that dropin centers provide transportation services, such as MetroCards.75
2. Crisis or Emergency Shelters
A crisis shelter offers emergency shelter for runaway and homeless
youth. The Basic Center Program administered by the United States
Family & Youth Services Bureau provides grants for emergency shelter for
youth who are eighteen years-old and younger.76 By contrast, New York
73.
74.

DURSO & GARY J. GATES, supra note 12, at 10.
Borough-Based Drop-In Centers, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF YOUTH AND COMMUNITY
DEV., http://www.nyc.gov/html/dycd/html/runaway/drop_in.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2015).
75. N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., CITY SPENDING FOR RUNAWAY AND HOMELESS
YOUTH
GROWS
STEADILY
3,
Aug.
2010,
www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/rhyaugust122010.pdf.
76. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5732a(3)(a)(1) (Westlaw 2015).
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State law provides funds for sheltering youth twenty-one years-old or
younger. This means that if a crisis or emergency shelter facility has a bed
available that is funded with federal money, that bed cannot be used to
serve a youth who is nineteen years-old or older,77 as is the case for youth
twenty-one years-old or older with regard to state funded facilities.
Basic Center Program crisis shelters are federally subsidized up to a
maximum of a twenty-one day stay per young person.78 On January 27,
2015, the Runaway and Homeless Youth and Trafficking Prevention Act
was referred to Committee.79 This critical legislation would also expand
the maximum stay in Basic Center Program shelters from twenty-one to
thirty days and fund street-based services for runaway and homeless
youth.80 The Committee has yet to take a vote, due to the opposition by
some Republican Senators to a non-discrimination clause that would
prohibit grant recipients from discriminating against youth on the basis of
gender identity or sexual orientation.
In New York City, crisis shelters are the entry-point for the DYCD’s
Runaway and Homeless Youth system. These voluntary, short-term
residential programs provide emergency shelter and crisis intervention
services aimed at reuniting youth with their families or, if family
reunification is not possible, arranging appropriate transitional and longterm placements.81 The maximum stay for emergency shelters varies by
program. For instance, Covenant House usually refers youth to an
independent living program if they have found employment, and if not,
then to the New York City adult shelter system after thirty days. In
contrast, depending on which of its four emergency housing sites are used,
the Ali Forney Center offers between one to six months. However, the
program reports an average waiting list of 200 young people, with youth
ages sixteen to twenty experiencing an average wait time of two weeks, and
youth ages twenty-one through twenty-four years-old experiencing a wait
as long as six months.82
A youth crisis or emergency shelter is more difficult to gain access to
than a drop-in center, in that its residents typically are routed through drop77.
78.
79.

N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., supra note 75, at 5.
Id.
GOVTRACK.US, S. 262: RUNAWAY AND HOMELESS YOUTH AND TRAFFICKING
PREVENTION ACT (2015).
80. The Runaway and Homeless Youth and Trafficking Prevention Act, S. 262,
114th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(B)(i) (2015-2017).
81. Crisis Shelters, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF YOUTH AND COMMUNITY DEV.,
www.nyc.gov/html/dycd/html/runaway/crisis.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
82. Emergency
Housing
Program,
ALI
FORNEY
CTR.,
http://www.aliforneycenter.org/programs/emergency/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
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in center staff. These shelter beds are rarely sited in the same building as a
drop-in center, but in any case a crisis or emergency shelter maintains
procedures such as screening at intake to determine client eligibility and
front-door staff who monitor and restrict entry by the general public,
regardless of whether they are sited in drop-in centers or other buildings.
3. Transitional Independent Living (“TIL”) Facilities
The federal government operates two state-federal cooperative grant
schemes to support transitional independent living. The Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 established Title III-B, also
known as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, to provide funds for
transitional living youth projects serving runaway and homeless youth. For
purposes of Part B funding, a qualifying homeless youth must be between
sixteen and twenty-two years-old, but provided the young person
commences a stay in the program before twenty-two years-old, they can
retain shelter up to the maximum stay provided by law.83 Specifically, the
law caps continuous shelter and services to individual youth at 540 days
(or, roughly 1.5 years), and in exceptional circumstances 635 days (or,
roughly 1.7 years).84 The law defines a transitional living youth project to
mean a project that “provides shelter and services designed to promote a
transition to self-sufficient living and to prevent long-term dependency on
social services.”85 The “shelter” provided under this program includes
facilities such as group homes and supervised apartments, with a maximum
of twenty residents, excluding staff.86
Separately, the Independent Living Program specific to foster careinvolved youth was written into Title IV-E as section 477 of the Social
Security Act in 1986, and substituted with the John H. Chafee Foster Care
Independence Program by the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999.87
Section 477 is intended to serve youth who are likely to remain in foster
care until age eighteen, youth who, after attaining sixteen years of age,
have left foster care for kinship guardianship or adoption, and young adults
ages eighteen to twenty-one who have “aged out” of the foster care system.
Section 477, in its current form, provides that participating states and tribes
can expend up to 30% of funds to provide room and board for youth who
leave foster care at eighteen up to the age of twenty-one years-old, as well
as the option to extend Medicaid services to these youth.88
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

42 U.S.C.A. § 5732a(3)(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2015).
Id. § 5714-2(a)(2).
Id. § 5732a(7).
Id. § 5714-2(a)(1)–(4).
Pub. L. 106–169, 113 Stat. 1882 (1999).
42 U.S.C.A. § 477 (Westlaw 2015).
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Transitional independent living programs may be accessed on an
“outpatient” basis by youth in family-based foster care, but the focus of this
Article is on social service settings where youth reside. In this context,
Transitional Independent Living (“TIL”) facilities provide these supportive
services in tandem with room and board in a physical building for homeless
youth between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one with long-term
residential services and wraparound supports.89 In New York City, all TIL
Programs are open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. A young person in
need of longer-term residential services must first visit a Crisis Shelter and
obtain a referral to TIL facilities. Youth may stay in the TIL facilities for
up to eighteen months, although some programs extend the stay up to two
years.90 Services offered at transitional living facilities include: educational
programs, vocational training, job placement assistance, counseling, and
basic life skills training.91
4. Supportive Housing
A supportive housing program is a service that integrates community
programs to provide shelter along with other critical resources, including
mental health and substance abuse programs for persons who lack adequate
housing and may be experiencing other safety needs. Supportive housing
tenants have leases or lease-like agreements with a landlord, pay rent, and
abide by the terms of their lease.92 Tenants typically pay 30% of their
income toward rent.93 Tenants also enter into an agreement with the
designated service provider for their unit, which might include mental
health counseling, help with life skills, relapse support, help with getting an
education, help getting and keeping a job, help with parenting, linkage to
medical care, crisis management, and help reunifying with family.94

89. Transitional Independent Living, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF YOUTH AND COMMUNITY
DEV., www.nyc.gov/html/dycd/html/runaway/independent.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2015).
90. See, e.g., Transitional Housing Program, ALI FORNEY CTR.,
http://www.aliforneycenter.org/programs/transitional-living/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
91. See generally CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM. [CWLA], CWLA STANDARDS
OF EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSITION, INDEPENDENT LIVING, AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
SERVICES (2005).
92. Elements of Supportive Housing, SUPPORTIVE HOUSING NET. OF N.Y.,
shnny.org/learn-more/what-is-supportive-housing/elements-of-supportive-housing/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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B. Institutional or Court-Mandated Social Service Settings
In addition to the voluntary social services described in Part II.A, certain
institutional placements are particularly vulnerable to law enforcement
entry for purposes of search, seizure, or arrest. These settings include
residential treatment facilities, group homes, and Supervised Independent
Living programs in which young people adjudicated in family court
proceedings are placed. The fact that youth are placed in these institutional
settings as wards of the state suggests that they have even less of a
reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to their person, room, and
belongings.
While secure facilities are indeed a category of institutional placement,
this section does not include a discussion of these facilities as they are
restricted by construction fixtures designed to physically restrict the
movements and activities of juveniles held in the facility.95 To be sure, law
enforcement may enter such facilities, but generally secure facilities are
self-regulating and include correctional personnel and internal methods to
adjust dispositions in family court proceedings based on delinquent conduct
that is alleged to have been committed on facility grounds.
Instead, this section focuses on youth placed in so-called limited-secure,
non-secure, and staff secure facilities, which are more likely to involve law
enforcement encounters on-premises. The Department of Justice has
created wide latitude for supposedly non-secure facilities to avoid
application of the federal ban on institutionalization of status offenders.
Namely, federal regulations specify that secure detention “does not include
facilities where physical restriction of movement or activity is provided
solely through facility staff.”96
Indeed, the Department of Justice has sanctioned this form of
institutionalization by staff secure facilities from the definition of “secure”
detention, such that a staff secure facility is deemed:
[A] residential facility (1) which does not include construction features
designed to physically restrict the movements and activities of juveniles
who are in custody therein, but any such physical restriction of
movement or activity is provided solely through staff; (2) which may
establish reasonable rules restricting entrance to and egress from the
facility; and (3) in which the movements and activities of individual
juvenile residents may, for treatment purposes, be restricted or subject to
97
control through the use of intensive staff supervision.
95.
96.
97.

42 U.S.C.A. § 5603(12)-(13) (Westlaw 2015).
28 C.F.R. § 31.304(b) (Westlaw 2015).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR MONITORING
FACILITIES UNDER THE JJDPA OF 2002 52-53 (2010). The term “residential facility
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This functionalist exception to the deinstitutionalization requirement for
status offenders also applies to a juvenile placed in a runaway shelter but
prevented from leaving due to staff restricting access to exits.98
On March 30, 2012, New York passed Close to Home legislation as part
of the 2012-2013 New York State Budget designed to provide young
people who are adjudicated as juvenile delinquents in New York City
Family Court with a continuum of community-based supervision and
program options. Close to Home authorizes the City of New York to
provide a broad range of services to young people who, for public safety
reasons, must be confined in non-secure residential placements located
close to their communities.99 Each non-secure facility has been designed to
ensure the safety and security of its residents, staff, and members of the
surrounding community.100 Programs maintain low staff-to-resident ratios
at all times, and facilities are equipped with security cameras, delayed
doors, and alarms on all windows and doors.101
1. Residential Treatment Facilities
A residential treatment facility is a structured 24-hour facility that
provides a range of therapeutic, educational, recreational and support
services for youth by a professional, interdisciplinary team.102 In contrast
to group homes, the primary emphasis of residential treatment facilities is
to provide residents with treatment for mental health problems, in addition
to also providing for their basic needs.103 For purposes of federal law,
these facilities are classified as psychiatric facilities, but generally
residential treatment facilities are less restrictive and less intensively
staffed than psychiatric centers and are operated by non-profit agencies.104
pertains to “facilities with the structural and operational capacity to securely detain
individuals overnight, and may include sleeping, shower and toilet, and day room
areas.” Final Revision of the Existing Formula Grants Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,132
(Dec. 10, 1996).
98. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP, supra note 103, at 52.
99. N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., CLOSE TO HOME: AN OVERVIEW OF
NON-SECURE
PLACEMENT
1
(2012),
www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/Close_to_Home_12.pdf.
100. Id. at 88.
101. Id. at 79.
102. HHS, supra note 9.
103. See generally Brady C. Bates, Diana J. English & Sophia Kouidou–Giles,
Residential Treatment and Its Alternatives: A Review of the Literature, 26 CHILD &
YOUTH CARE FORUM 7 (1997).
104. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT
FACILITIES – WESTERN REGION 1 (2011).
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In New York State, as in many other states, where a young person has
been adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent and is in the custody of a local
social service agency such as the Administration for Children’s Services,
they may be placed in a residential treatment facility. Nationwide, the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the United States
Department of Justice founds in its biennial Juvenile Residential Facility
Census that residential treatment centers made up 39% of all facilities
surveyed and held 42% of the nation’s juvenile offenders.105
2. Group Homes
A group home is a residence intended to meet the needs of children who
are unable to live in a family setting and do not need a more intensive
residential service, and normally house between 4 and 12 youth.106 A
group home placement is commonly referred to as a non-secure or staff
secure placement, because they generally do not include construction
fixtures designed to physically restrict the movements and activities of
juveniles held in the home.
3. Supervised Independent Living Programs
A Supervised Independent Living (“SIL”) program is a placement in
which a youth sixteen or older who is still in the care of a county child
welfare agency lives in settings where they are allowed age-appropriate
freedom and responsibility while also receiving the supervision and
guidance of the child welfare agency or a service provider.107 SIL settings
may include: scattered-site or semi-supervised apartments, clustered or
supervised apartments, shared homes, adult roommate apartments,
specialized foster homes, host homes, boarding homes, or subsidized
housing.108 A SIL placement may have varying levels of supervision:
ranging from minimal, such as off-site case management, to more
restrictive, such as live-in or overnight staff supervision in an agencyowned building.109
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS REGULATING LAW ENFORCEMENT ENTRY
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the

105. SARAH HOCKENBERRY ET AL., JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CENSUS
(2012), www.ncjj.org/pdf/247207.pdf.
106. HHS, supra note 9.
107. JUVENILE LAW CTR., supra note 45.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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right to be free from unreasonable search, seizure, and arrest.110 This
Article focuses on nationally applicable standards regulating law
enforcement entry in social service settings for purposes of responding to
an emergency, executing a search, or conducting an arrest. Where New
York State and local law require additional protections, they are mentioned
briefly to supply additional context.
The various social service settings where young people encounter law
enforcement provide a range of competing standards governing law
enforcement entry. While a tenant in a supportive housing apartment has
the same rights as any tenant, for instance, a drop-in center, emergency or
crisis shelter, or transitional living program present more complicated
circumstances. For this among other reasons, it is critical that youthserving professionals in all social service settings adhere to the strict
warrant-checking, entry protocol, and meticulous documentation practices
described infra Part IV to preserve their client’s ability to challenge
deficiencies in a warrant in order to suppress evidence in a criminal trial,
bring an individual or organizational civil suit for police misconduct, or file
a complaint with a local law enforcement oversight entity.
A. Validity of a Warrant
A warrant in the Fourth Amendment context is an order signed by a
magistrate or judge that permits a law enforcement officer to perform a
search, seizure, or arrest.111 The proper evaluation of a warrant for its
validity is perhaps the most important role for a youth-serving professional
confronted with law enforcement efforts to enter a social service setting. It
is a critical tool of any criminal legal defense to suppress evidence,
particularly those offenses brought against LGBTQ youth, such as drug or
weapons possession, petit larceny, or the possession of condoms as
evidence of a prostitution related offense.
To obtain a warrant, a law enforcement officer must convince a neutral
magistrate that he has probable cause that contraband—evidence of a crime
or a person to be arrested—will be found in the area searched. The Fourth
Amendment requires that a search warrant specify with “particularity” the
place to be searched and the items or persons to be seized,112 but in certain
cases a misdescription of a person or the premises may not render the
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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warrant invalid.113 For instance, law enforcement may obtain and enforce a
valid arrest warrant using an incorrect name, if supplemented by a
photograph or adequate description, including characteristics such as
height, weight, and age114 or even where an error in an arrestee’s surname
exists, but the warrant correctly designated the defendant’s address.115 A
youth-serving professional should therefore examine and record the terms
of the proffered warrant to verify that the warrant specifies the address
where the person is located, including the floor or suite number, and the
exact spelling of the person named for arrest.
In executing the warrant, law enforcement must comply with the terms
and limitations contained in the warrant, such that officers “search” only
the areas and items authorized by its language—but note the discussion
infra Part III.B for variations on this rule, particularly the plain view
exception, which permits police who are lawfully on the premises or in a
position to observe items that are discovered in plain view to seize items
that may be evidence of a crime or contraband. Law enforcement may also
comply with the terms of the warrant by including the hours during which
the warrant may be executed. In New York State, a search warrant may be
executed any day of the week, but only between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and
9:00 p.m.,116 unless a “nighttime” or “anytime” search is authorized by a
judge based on the warrant’s allegations supporting a departure from the
general rule.117 Similarly, law enforcement officers executing a warrant
must generally “knock and announce” their presence and purpose before
forcibly entering the place to be searched, although where an officer
reasonably believes doing so would be futile, dangerous, or would inhibit
the investigation they may do so.118 In New York State, among others, an
officer may apply for a “no-knock” warrant in special circumstances. A
youth-serving professional should therefore closely monitor and record the
officers’ compliance with a warrant’s terms, including any departure from
the areas or items specified in the warrant (e.g., opening a locker when the
warrant specifies a common room where the locker is located), as well as
any violation of the approved time for the warrant’s execution or the
manner of its service.
Each jurisdiction may have categorical time limitations adopted by
113. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Error, in Either Search Warrant or Application for
Warrant, As To Address of Place To Be Searched as Rendering Warrant Invalid, 103
A.L.R. 5th 463 (2002).
114. People v. Rawluck, 198 N.E.2d 266, 266 (N.Y. 1964).
115. People v. Brooks, 388 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (App. Div. 1976).
116. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.30(2) (LexisNexis 2015).
117. Id. § 690.45[6]; § 690.35[4][a]; § 690.40[2].
118. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995).
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statute or rule that may be written into a warrant. For instance, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require that in all cases except for a trackingdevice warrant, a federal warrant to search for and seize a person or
property must command the officer to “execute the warrant within a
specified time no longer than 14 days,”119 and New York State provides
that a search warrant must be executed within ten days of issuance.120 A
youth-serving professional should therefore clearly refuse—but not
obstruct or resist—entry by an officer without a timely warrant.
For reasons discussed in more detail infra Part III.C, specifically the
consent search and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement, it is
vitally important that youth-serving professionals not permit entry to law
enforcement without first asking the officer to produce a warrant and
checking its validity, or obtaining the officer’s explicit affirmation that a
valid warrant exists. Even then, it is important that the youth-serving
professional nonetheless state “You cannot enter. You do not have consent
to enter” when stepping aside because a judge might later determine that
the warrant was invalid for whatever reason, but without stating nonconsent, a person may be interpreted to have consented to the police
entering the space.
With that said, it is unlikely that any amount of training can prepare a
youth-serving professional to best evaluate the validity of law enforcement
entry without a warrant in hand. While evaluating a warrant can be as
simple as checking for things such as timeliness, the correct spelling or
description of the person to be arrested, the floor and unit number of the
space to be searched, and whether a judge or magistrate signed the warrant,
there are a number of well-established exceptions that may categorize the
law enforcement action in question to be a non-search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment or that the action itself was reasonable as
discussed infra Part III.B-C, which renders entry lawful, certain evidence
admissible in a criminal or other proceeding, and potentially bars a civil
suit for police misconduct. By following the best practices described in
more detail infra Part IV, however, youth-serving professionals can still
comply with an ostensibly valid warrant without putting clients or staff at
further risk, while still preserving this crucial suppression argument that
may at the very least offer room for a defense attorney to negotiate down
the severity of the charge.
B. Warrantless On-Premises Arrests
Before detailing the requirements for a warrantless search in a social
119.
120.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.30(1).
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service setting, it is important to note the slightly different standard
applicable to a warrantless arrest. In a public place a law enforcement
officer does not need a warrant to arrest a person who commits a
misdemeanor in their presence or where the officer has probable cause to
believe the person committed a felony, whether or not the felony occurred
in their presence, if there are reasonable grounds for making the arrest.121
A “public place” can be a sidewalk, street, or even the vestibule of an
apartment building.122
However, law enforcement is required to have a warrant to execute any
arrest in a person’s home or dwelling absent one or more of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement described infra Part III.C. Where the suspect to
be arrested is sought out in the residence of a third party, such as a friend,
relative, or social service setting, law enforcement must obtain both an
arrest and search warrant.
C. Warrantless On-Premises Searches and Seizures of a
Person or Property
While it is not unheard of that law enforcement secures a search and
arrest warrant for social service settings, it is far more common that police
will rely on psychological tactics to gain entry. The Supreme Court has
held that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and any
evidence seized without a warrant will be suppressed.123 The Court in Katz
v. United States famously stated that the warrant requirement is subject
“only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” but
subsequent case law has drastically expanded the number and breadth of
these exceptions.124 This Article reviews only those exceptions to the
warrant requirement most applicable to social service settings, and
therefore does not discuss important exceptions and variations applicable
to: Terry stop-and-frisks; protective sweeps; administrative or civil
warrants; automobile searches; plain feel, smell, and hearing; border
searches; and foreign intelligence surveillance. The Article similarly does
not discuss the exclusionary rule justifying suppression of evidence in
detail, or related exceptions to exclusion of evidence such as independent
source or officer “good faith.”
The Fourth Amendment protects only a person’s reasonable expectation
of privacy in a protected area or item or a physical intrusion of property.125
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 44 (1976).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012). See also Erica Goldberg,
How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110
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Where the item or area searched does not readily conform to a traditionally
protected category—such as one’s person (e.g., body, clothing worn at time
of search), residence (e.g., apartment, hotel room), papers (e.g., letters,
personal correspondence), or personal belongings (e.g., purse, backpack,
locker)—a court may weigh the evidence and determine that the
governmental intrusion was not a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The class differential in the Fourth Amendment’s
conception of “privacy” is readily apparent.126 For example, courts have
removed from Fourth Amendment protection homeless encampments and
cardboard shelters on both private and public land.127
Even if a court determines there is a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, they may still decide based on the context within
which a search takes place that it is not “unreasonable,” after balancing a
subject’s privacy interests against legitimate interests of law
enforcement.128 A classic example of an exception to the warrant
requirement based on reasonableness is an inventory search. This warrant
exception, commonly applied to booking an arrestee or conducting a search
of an impounded or seized car, allows police to perform a search of a
person or items lawfully in police control, where the search is conducted
according to a routine administrative policy and not done solely to look for
evidence of criminal conduct.129
Similarly, DNA identification,
fingerprinting, and photographing of a lawfully arrested person have been
found reasonable searches, because that information can be considered part
of a routine booking procedure and an arrestee in law enforcement custody
has a diminished expectation of privacy.130
1. The Consent Search Exception
The Fourth Amendment provides protection only to a person whose
privacy interest is affected by the search or seizure. This means that where
a youth-serving professional gives consent to law enforcement to enter,
youth themselves may have more limited grounds to challenge their arrest
or suppress the evidence seized. Consent searches are perhaps the most
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 62 (2012).
126. See generally Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1389 (2012).
127. See id. at 1393 n.34 (collecting cases). But see Lavan v. City of Los Angeles,
797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a homeless person’s unattended personal
belongings from unreasonable seizures).
128. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
129. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1983).
130. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
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common tactics relied upon by police, with one study finding that over
90% of warrantless police searches are accomplished using the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.131
For a consent search to be valid, consent must be voluntary and
intelligent, but a police officer does not need to instruct the subject that she
has the right to refuse.132 Whether a court will find that consent is
voluntary or intelligent is influenced by the presence of duress or coercion,
either express or implied, as well as the age of the subject and the level of
education or intelligence.133 The Supreme Court has found that certain
police tactics are coercive such that they prevent voluntary consent,
specifically that “when a law enforcement officer claims authority to search
a home under a warrant, he announces, in effect, that the occupant has no
right to resist the search. . . . Where there is coercion, there cannot be
consent.”134
The special circumstance of social service settings—where third party
staff or co-occupant clients or residents may be asked by police to permit
police entry—raises especially important questions for youth-serving
professionals. If a police officer obtains consent to search the premises
from someone who lacks the actual authority to grant it, the consent is still
valid if the officer reasonably believed the consenting party had actual
authority.135 This exception, known as the apparent authority rule, is
further complicated where premises are shared, as in many social service
settings. When a residence is shared, any occupant can consent to search of
common area on the premises, but if co-occupants who are also present
disagree regarding consent to search, the objecting party prevails as to the
area over which the parties share control.136
A youth-serving professional should never consent to law enforcement
entry, but instead should request the production of a warrant and evaluate
its validity as discussed supra Part III.A. In the event that law enforcement
threatens to or does use force to obtain entry anyway, it is important that
staff repeat “You do not have permission to enter.” If law enforcement
seeks to rely on a client’s invitation to enter, youth-serving staff should still
not consent to entry where other clients’ Fourth Amendment rights would
be at risk. Staff may also seek to negotiate a compromise with law

131. Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005).
132. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
133. Id. at 225-26.
134. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
135. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
136. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).
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enforcement, such that they inform a young named in a warrant of its
contents and offer to help plan for his or her safety, escort him or her when
taken into custody, and appear at arraignment and subsequent court dates to
advocate on his or her behalf. In the congregate-care supportive housing
context, consent is complicated by the fact that tenants are leaseholders
who can permit entry to the police if they so choose. It is advisable that
staff confirm a tenant’s permission for the police to enter in writing at the
time consent is given, and include applicable disclaimers to limit the scope
of consent so that the search can only extend to areas such as the youth’s
own apartment and those common spaces necessary for police to traverse in
order to enter the apartment.
2. Exigent Circumstances: The “Hot Pursuit,” Emergency Aid, and
Evanescent Evidence Exceptions
One broad category of exceptions to the warrant requirement is
commonly referred to as exigent circumstances—meaning circumstances
that exist in emergency situations where there is a serious risk to other
people or where evidence may be destroyed or disappear in the time it takes
to obtain a warrant.137 The exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant
requirement include “hot pursuit,” emergency aid, and evanescent
evidence.
Under the first such exception, law enforcement may enter the home of a
suspect or third party when in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing felon, and any
evidence of criminal activity discovered in plain view while searching for
the suspect on-premises is admissible. However, there should be an
immediate or continuous pursuit of the arrestee from the scene of the crime,
and the gravity of the crime committed is a significant factor in deciding
whether the search was justified.138 For example, the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless home search where the police were reliably informed
that an armed robbery suspect entered a specific house five minutes
earlier,139 but in another case ruled that a driving under the influence charge
punishable by fine but not imprisonment was not sufficiently serious to
justify warrantless entry into the arrestee’s home to conduct an arrest.140 A
youth-serving professional confronted with officers’ explanations that they
are in “hot pursuit” should therefore inquire and record specifics of the
alleged criminal activity and any time lapse between the alleged criminal
activity and the officers’ arrival at the social service setting.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Warrant, supra note 117.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
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Another commonly cited exception is the “emergency aid” rule, by
which police may enter a home or dwelling without a warrant when there is
an objectively reasonable basis for believing a person inside is in need of
emergency aid to address or prevent imminent injury.141 Clear cases of
circumstances justifying warrantless entry for emergency aid include the
sound of a gunshot coming from a home or smoke pouring out of a
building. The Supreme Court, in one example, upheld the emergency aid
exception where police responded to a complaint of a “loud party” and
observed through a window upon arrival an ongoing physical altercation
between an adult and a juvenile in which the adult was punched in the face,
drawing blood.142
A third exception is the “evanescent evidence” exception, where law
enforcement may perform a minimally intrusive search where the evidence
would dissipate or disappear in the time it would take to obtain a warrant.
This exception is commonly invoked to justify “searches” of persons
involving fingernail and DNA evidence, as well as drug and alcohol testing
in certain circumstances, on the theory that the evidence may be destroyed
or disappear by the time police obtain a warrant.143 Similar to the “hot
pursuit” exception, a court may consider the severity of the crime
contemplated in deciding whether warrantless entry is justified to prevent
destruction of evidence.144 A youth-serving professional confronted with
officers’ explanation that they are attempting to prevent the destruction of
evidence should therefore inquire and record specifics of the alleged
criminal activity.
3. The Plain View Exception
The plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
is particularly relevant to social service settings. It may allow police to
seize incriminating evidence in plain view after entering to execute an
arrest—but not search—warrant, provide “emergency aid,” or upon the
consent of an occupant. For the plain view exception to apply, however,
the police must lawfully be on the premises or in a position to observe
items that are discovered in plain view, and it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items in plain view properly can be seized as
they may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.145
141.
142.
143.

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2006).
Id. at 406.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (upholding warrantless search of
evidence found underneath a murder suspect’s fingernails).
144. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
145. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss2/1

30

Conner: Salvaging "Safe Spaces": Toward Model Standards for LGBTQ Youth-Serving Professionals Encountering Law Enforcement

2016]

SALVAGING “SAFE SPACES”

229

4. Special Needs Exception
As stated previously, whether a search or seizure is “reasonable” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the context within
which a search takes place. Courts have articulated a “special needs”
exception to the warrant requirement where an investigation’s primary
programmatic purpose is civil or administrative in nature, such that the
need to search against outweighs the constitutional intrusiveness of the
search.146
A subcategory of these cases turn on the diminished expectation of
privacy attributable to a person who bears some relationship to the state.
This trend is particularly relevant to those young people in institutional
placements such as residential treatment centers, group homes, or
supervised independent living pursuant to a court order. For instance,
courts have permitted suspicionless home visits as a condition of receiving
public benefits,147 routine searches of inmate cells,148 random drug testing
of students in athletic and extracurricular programs,149 and warrantless
police entry where a person obtains a “keep the peace” order for a police
escort to remove his or her personal belongings from her former home with
the assistance of a law enforcement officer.150
5. The Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest Exception
Yet another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is
triggered where a police officer performs a lawful, custodial arrest, and
conducts a search to protect his own safety and preserve evidence.151 The
search must be contemporaneous in time and place with the arrest, and the
scope of the search is limited to an arrestee’s body, clothing, and any bags,
containers, or other personal belongings within the suspect’s immediate
control.152 The Supreme Court, for instance, permitted introduction of
evidence seized in a search incident to a lawful arrest, where an officer
removed a cigarette box from a suspect’s pocket and discovered heroin
contained within it upon opening it.153

146. Henderson v. City of Semi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal citation omitted).
147. Sanchez v. City of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 928 (9th Cir. 2006).
148. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
149. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
150. Henderson, 305 F.3d at 1059.
151. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 223-24.
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In contrast, states may adopt more restrictive procedures by state
constitution or statute. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals held
in People v. Gokey that under Article 1, section 12 of the New York State
Constitution, police may only search a closed container incident to a lawful
arrest when they have a reasonable belief that the container search is
necessary to protect themselves or to prevent the destruction of evidence.154
D. Criminal Liability for Refusal to Admit Law Enforcement
It is not uncommon that police with or without a valid reason to enter a
social service setting may threaten staff with arrest for obstruction for
refusing to admit them onto the premises. In New York, the offense of
Obstruction of Governmental Administration in the Second Degree, a Class
A misdemeanor, occurs when a person “intentionally obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by
means of any independently unlawful act. . . .”155 It is also important to
note the offense of Resisting Arrest, also a Class A misdemeanor, which
occurs when a person “intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a
police officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself
or another person.”156
In New York these charges require that police have lawful authority to
conduct an arrest or demand entry in the first place.157 In other words if
police attempt to gain entry without a valid warrant or exigent
circumstances as described supra Parts III.B-C, a refusal to permit entry,
without more, does not constitute obstruction or resisting arrest. Where a
law enforcement officer is however enforcing a valid arrest warrant, the
refusal of a staff member to allow police entry may be grounds for
obstruction if police reasonably believe that the subject of the warrant is
present in the residence.158 In the context of exigent circumstances, there
are a variety of qualifying exceptions to the warrant requirement discussed
supra Parts III.B-C that would apply to this scenario. A typical
justification, for instance, for police officers who have not secured warrants
before attempting entry in social service settings is the “emergency aid.”
Yet in one recent case, an obstruction charge was dismissed as facially
insufficient to trigger the “emergency aid” exception, where the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

457 N.E.2d 723, 724 (N.Y. 1983).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05 (LexisNexis 2015).
Id. § 205.30.
People v. Lupinacci, 595 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (App. Div. 1993).
People v. Paige, 911 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (App. Div. 2010).
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information alleged only that the police responded to the apartment due to a
radio run and heard crying and shouting inside, but there was no indication
that the shouting suggested anyone was in imminent danger, and those
present in the apartment refused the police entry.159
A youth-serving professional should also be prepared to withstand police
agitation up to and including threats to arrest them. It is critical that staff
have adequate time to evaluate whether the police have presented a valid
warrant. Despite what the officer may say to the contrary, even in
situations where staff believe that in this particular case the police have a
valid warrant or exigent circumstances exist to justify entry, they may still
minimize the scope of the search, accompany the police, warn of police
presence to clients or members inside the facility, and take any and all
notes or recordings so long as the staff does not interfere using
intimidation, physical force or interference, or any independently unlawful
act.
If despite the best efforts of the appropriate personnel, police nonetheless
forcibly enter the premises, staff should not physically interfere with the
police but instead state loudly and clearly “You cannot enter. You do not
have consent to enter” and follow the appropriate facility emergency, staffpolice escort, and incident reporting protocols. Taking this approach
allows staff to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of their clients and
members while also minimizing their personal exposure to prosecution and
conviction for obstruction or resisting arrest.
V. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS
RESULTING IN FALSE ARREST OR OTHER POLICE MISCONDUCT
It is possible that counselors, social workers, security guards, and other
professional staff may themselves initiate calls to police to request their
assistance or the arrest of their clients or tenants, as well as the guests of
tenants. Despite the clear danger posed to these young people by police, it
is often the case that facility personnel themselves independently initiate
police contact. This conduct, if not properly supervised and recorded, may
risk incurring liability. For instance the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information and the false reporting of a crime may subject an
organization and its staff to liability, up to and including revocation of a
professional license or certification, criminal prosecution, or both.
In New York State as in other states, counselors, social workers, and
security guards are licensed according to state law, and so any unlawful act
159. People v. Holmes, 997 N.Y.S.2d 669, 669 (Crim. Ct. 2014). See also People
v. Briggs, 890 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (Crim. Ct. 2009) (finding defendant’s refusal to
admit the police without a warrant did not amount to obstruction despite allegations
that officers heard “fighting and shouting” within the apartment).
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regardless of whether an arrest was made can result in the revocation of a
professional license.160 This is especially true for conduct that bears a
relationship to the duties of the professional in question. The regulatory
definition for “unprofessional conduct” governing licensed social work in
New York State includes “willfully making or filing a false report . . . or
willfully impeding or obstructing such filing, or inducing another person to
do so.”161 In contrast the law specifically states that the principal duties of
a security guard include “deterrence, observation, detection, and/or
reporting unlawful or unauthorized activity,” meaning that a security guard
is in breach of this duty when they falsely report a crime.162 Separate from
concerns of unprofessional conduct, the false reporting of a crime or
offense is one punishable by criminal law. In New York even the lowest
degree of this offense, the third degree, carries an “A” misdemeanor and is
punishable by up to one year in jail.163
A. Breach of Confidentiality
There is a serious risk of breach in confidentiality posed by youthserving professionals, particularly physicians and mental health
professionals, when they interface with third parties such as security guards
and law enforcement. The violation of the federal privacy and security
rules established by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) of 1996 may result in an investigation by the Office for
Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services.164 The Privacy Rule requirements contained in HIPAA apply to
“health care providers” and their “business associates” as defined by
regulation. A covered health care provider is one that transmits health
information electronically for the purposes of a transaction covered under
the HIPAA Transaction Rule, and furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care
in the normal course of business.165 A “business associate” is a person or
entity, other than a member of the workforce of a covered entity, who
performs functions or activities on behalf of, or provides certain services to,
a covered entity that involve access by the business associate to protected
health information.166 A permanent supportive housing provider is a
business associate under HIPAA when it provides a service to a covered
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 89-f (6) (LexisNexis 2015).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (LexisNexis 2015).
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 89-f.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50 (LexisNexis 2015).
Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 10491, 110 Stat 1936 (1996).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.
166. Id. § 160.103.
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entity and receives, uses, or discloses a client’s PHI in the process.167
The Privacy Rule requirements provide that without a court order or
written authorization from the client, a covered entity and its staff can only
disclose protected health information to law enforcement in certain
circumstances. Even then, the Privacy Rule requires adherence to the
principle of “minimum necessary” use and disclosure, such that a covered
entity must make reasonable efforts to use, disclose, and request only the
minimum amount of protected health information needed to accomplish the
intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.168 A covered entity may
disclose protected health information to law enforcement officials for law
enforcement purposes where: (1) required by law (including court orders,
court-ordered warrants, subpoenas) and administrative requests; (2) to
identify or locate a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or missing person;
(3) in response to a law enforcement official’s request for information
about a victim or suspected victim of a crime; (4) to alert law enforcement
of a person’s death, if the covered entity suspects that criminal activity
caused the death; (5) when a covered entity believes that protected health
information is evidence of a crime that occurred on its premises; and (6) by
a covered health care provider in a medical emergency not occurring on its
premises, when necessary to inform law enforcement about the commission
and nature of a crime, the location of the crime or crime victims, and the
perpetrator of the crime.169
A violation of a federal Privacy Rule requirement may result in civil
monetary penalties against a covered entity of $100 per failure to
comply.170
A person who knowingly obtains or discloses health
information in violation of HIPAA faces a fine of $50,000 and
imprisonment up to one year.171 This penalty increases to a fine up to
$100,000 and imprisonment up to five years if the conduct involves “false
pretenses,” and it increases to a fine of up to $250,000 and up to ten years
imprisonment if the conduct involves the intent to sell, transfer or use
individually identifiable health information “for commercial advantage,
167. PUBLIC COUNSEL, ANNOTATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE AGREEMENT FOR
PERMANENT
SUPPORTIVE
HOUSING
DEVELOPERS
1
(2015),
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0652.pdf.
168. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514 (d).
169. Id. § 164.512(f). See also id. § 164.512(j) (providing that covered entities may
disclose protected health information that they believe is necessary to prevent or lessen
a serious and imminent threat to a person or the public, when such disclosure is made
to someone they believe can prevent or lessen the threat).
170. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §1320d-5 [Westlaw 2015]).
171. Id.
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personal gain, or malicious harm.”172
While many social service settings are familiar with federal HIPAA,
local or state protections may exceed federal law. New York is particularly
protective of patient medical information.173 New York law provides
special protection to mental health174 and HIV-related information.175 The
coverage of the New York scheme is also realtively broad, as for instance
New York defines “mental disability” to include alcoholism, substance
dependence, and chemical dependence.176 New York law also carries
added protection for patients relative to federal standards in the protection
of patient medical information from law enforcement scrutiny. In contrast
to the HIPAA exception for disclosures required by law, court order,
subpoena, or administrative request, for instance, New York State requires
a court order for disclosure of mental health information.177 New York also
limits disclosure to law enforcement for purposes of identifying or locating
a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or missing person, or in response to a
law enforcement request for information about a victim of a crime, to
“identifying data concerning hospitalization.”178
A youth-serving
professional in New York is therefore further limited in their ability to
involve law enforcement, such that it may only disclose to law enforcement
protected health information that is minimally necessary to show evidence
of a crime that occurred on its premises or against its staff. The reasons for
such a disclosure should be fully documented in clinical and facility
records.
B. Involuntary Commitment to a Hospital or Psychiatric Facility
Under New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, individuals may, under certain
circumstances, be involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility to
receive specialized care.179 There are two categories of procedures most
often used by social service settings to attempt involuntary commitment in
New York. In each case, a licensed provider or security guard may face
license revocation or criminal prosecution for departing from the standard
for involuntary commitment.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c(1)(3)(f) (LexisNexis 2015).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 13.13, 13.16 (LexisNexis 2015).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782. See also id. § 2783(1)-(2) (providing that the
unauthorized disclosure of HIV-related information may be punished by a $5,000 fine
for each occurrence, and the act is punishable as a misdemeanor).
176. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(3).
177. Id. § 33.13.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 9.27.
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The “two physician certificate” procedure provides that a hospital may
receive a patient for a psychiatric evaluation upon the certificates of two
examining physicians, accompanied by an application for the admission of
such person made within ten days prior to such admission.180 The
application itself however may be filed by a variety of actors, including a
person who resides with the person alleged to need commitment, a police
officer, or an officer of any public or chartable institution or agency in
which the person alleged to be in need of commitment resides.181
The standard for evaluation of an involuntary admission on medical
certification in New York is whether the person has a mental illness for
which care and treatment in a mental hospital is essential, the person’s
judgment is too impaired to understand the need for such care and
treatment, and as a result of the mental illness, the person poses a
substantial threat of harm to self or others.182 This may include the
person’s refusal or inability to meet his or her essential need for food,
shelter, clothing or health care, or the person’s history of dangerous
conduct associated with noncompliance with mental health treatment
programs. The examining physician must consider alternative forms of
care and treatment that might be adequate to provide for the person’s needs
without requiring involuntary hospitalization.183 A patient may be held
involuntarily up to sixty days, but within sixty days from the date of
commitment a hospital must apply for a court order of retention, which the
person held may request a hearing to challenge.184
The “emergency” involuntary commitment procedure is more common,
as it does not require a formal application. The “emergency” procedure
chosen may trigger different time periods of commitment. If the person
who is held is brought under the first form of emergency commitment, they
are entitled to a psychiatric evaluation within forty-eight hours of
hospitalization, and a maximum of fifteen days from the date of
commitment.185 However, if the person subject to an “emergency”
commitment is brought to a Comprehensive Psychiatry Emergency
Program, they must be evaluated within six hours by a staff physician and
within twenty-four hours by a staff psychiatrist, which may result in being
held up to seventy-hours hours before discharge. However the patient may
be subsequently held if determined to meet the involuntary or emergency

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. § 9.27(a)-(b).
Id. § 9.27.
Id. § 9.01.
Id. § 9.27(d).
Id. § 9.33.
Id. § 9.39(b).
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standards previously mentioned, and admitted to an appropriate facility.186
The standard for emergency medical commitment requires reasonable
cause to believe that the person has a mental illness for which immediate
observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is
likely to result in serious harm to him or herself or others.187 “Substantial
threat of harm” is defined as a substantial risk of physical harm to the
person as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily
harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to
himself or herself, or a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as
manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are
placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.188
Unlike the medical certification procedure, the “emergency” involuntary
commitment procedures allow for any person to escort and involuntarily
commit a person with mental illness to a hospital. The name of the person
who escorted will be logged into the hospital’s program records, along with
details of the circumstances leading that person to admit someone with
alleged mental illness to the program.189
In the case of social service settings, it is advisable to adopt the strictest
of procedures to minimize staff reliance on involuntary commitment,
whatever the procedural route taken to obtain it. To this extent, an
organization ought to coordinate evaluations with affiliated, but
independent, medical and psychiatric staff, if any, and ensure that any
physicians or psychiatrists external to the organization that are nonetheless
treating the patient are consulted in the decision whether to initiate a
commitment procedure or not.
It is also strongly advised that social service settings do not rely on
police to involuntarily commit clients or tenants, due to the risk of
escalation resulting in injury and the possible addition of criminal charges.
When taking a person into custody or transporting them to a hospital
pursuant to the New York Mental Hygiene Law, police, ambulance
services, and emergency medical technicians are immune from ordinary
negligence claims; however, they can be held liable for injuring the arrestee
if they are grossly negligent, meaning they cause an injury resulting from a
conscious and voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care.190

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 9.40 (e)-(f).
Id. § 9.39.
Id. § 9.39.
Id. § 9.40(a).
Id. § 9.59. Note, however, that the immunity provision does not apply to the
negligent operation of a person to be involuntarily committed in a vehicle resulting in
injury.
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C. False Reporting of Trespass, Harassment, or Other Criminal Offense
Falsely reporting an incident or crime is punishable by state penal law.
In New York, the lowest degree of this offense, the third degree, carries an
“A” misdemeanor and is punishable by up to one year in jail.191 The
offense applies where a person “[g]ratuitously reports to a law enforcement
officer or agency (a) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which
did not in fact occur; or (b) an allegedly impending occurrence of an
offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur; or (c) false
information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged
implication of some person therein.”192 In certain circumstances this
charge may also be supplemented with others, such as reckless
endangerment.193
Notwithstanding the offenses of false reporting in the second and first
degrees, which deal primarily with false reporting of a fire, explosion, or
the release of a hazardous substance, the offense of false reporting in the
third degree is not limited in type by the class of incident or crime
reported.194 This Article is therefore somewhat limited in that it is
impossible to summarize all potential reportable offenses in the New York
Penal Law. It is therefore advisable that social service settings provide
advance guidance as well as direct supervision of the reporting of an
incident or offense, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
With that said, there are particular offenses that social service personnel
commonly misreport that will be used as models addressed by this Article.
While Part IV.B concerned grounds for involuntary commitment in New
York, this section provides a brief overview of harassment and trespass law
in New York. In pertinent part the New York Penal Law states “a person is
guilty of Harassment in the Second Degree when, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person,” he or she 1) “strikes, shoves, kicks or
otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or
threatens to do the same; 2) follows a person in or about a public place or
places; or 3) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts
which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no
legitimate purpose.”195 Harassment in the First Degree occurs when a
person “intentionally and repeatedly harasses another person by following

191.
192.
193.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50 (LexisNexis 2015).
Id. § 240.50[3].
See, e.g., id. § 120.20 (providing that “[a] person is guilty of reckless
endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.”).
194. See id. §§ 240.55, 240.60.
195. Id. § 240.26.
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such person in or about a public place or places or by engaging in a course
of conduct or by repeatedly committing acts which place such person in
reasonable fear of physical injury.”196 The offenses are admittedly broad,
but it is critical that personnel not characterize behavior of their clients as
“harassment” that is actually protected behavior, such as freely associating
with peers, reporting a wrong committed against them, or appealing an
agency decision. In a more specific example of the dangers of youthserving professionals playing judge and jury, staff may call police claiming
a client or member is “harassing” them when the youth records
conversations between them. But this is in fact not a criminal offense, as
New York adopts a “one party consent” approach to recordings and it is
only a crime to record or eavesdrop on an in-person or telephone
conversation where no party to the conversation consents.197
Another offense that is often misreported by youth-serving professionals,
particularly in supportive housing programs, is trespass. Under the New
York Penal Law, a person is guilty of trespassing when he or she
“knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.”198 The
charge may be upgraded to Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree where
the alleged trespasser does so in a building or upon real property that is a
“public housing project.”199 Finally, the charge may rise to Criminal
Trespass in the Second Degree, when a person knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a “dwelling,” meaning “a building which is usually occupied
by a person lodging therein at night.”200
In the case of a supportive housing residence, authority to lawfully
remain in common areas is shared by both the landlord and tenant. A guest
is only guilty of trespassing when a privilege to remain in the building is
revoked by a lawful order to leave that is personally communicated to the
trespasser by an authorized person, and the guest then demonstrates no
intent to leave.201
VI. CONCLUSION
The recommendations advanced by this Article are not intended to be
exhaustive, but instead to stimulate the development of comprehensive
model standards for youth-serving professionals to preserve the Fourth
Amendment and other rights of young people in social service settings.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. § 240.25.
See id. §§ 250.00, 250.05.
Id. § 140.05.
Id. § 140.10(e).
Id. §§ 140.00(3), 140.15(1).
See People v. Wolf, 312 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
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This Article is unable to address many policy and practice issues that fall
within the ambit of the professional responsibility of LGBTQ youthserving personnel, such as preventing discrimination in admissions,
increasing safety from staff-on-tenant and tenant-on-tenant harassment and
abuse, mediating grievances, ensuring due process before program
exclusion or restriction determinations, meaningfully involving clients or
tenants in service planning and the development of reasonable program
rules. These issues—each of which the improper resolution of contributes
to the vulnerability of youth to police misconduct—will be addressed in a
future writing.
A variety of best practices have been discussed, such as ensuring a staff
escort at all times to monitor and record the characteristics and actions of
the officers present; informing the officers that the space caters to persons
with mental health issues and demanding that they respect their
Emotionally Disturbed Persons policy and refer the matter to a properly
trained team in lieu of entry; informing the officers in the case of an arrest
warrant that staff will announce to youth in the program that there is an
outstanding warrant and offer to escort the young person to ensure better
treatment, record any violations, and connect clients to arraignment and
court support as well as independent legal representation. Service
providers should also establish written staff protocol for police encounters
including staff escorting, monitoring, and reporting of police encounters on
uniform incident reports, as well as automatic preservation of any relevant
evidence, including the preservation of CCTV footage and witness
statements.
The danger of unfettered access to social service settings by law
enforcement is perhaps better illustrated not by law and policy, but by the
circumstances surrounding a recent police-involved killing in New York
City. On August 24, 2015, Harold Carter and Vicente Matias, two veteran
detectives of the 26th Precinct of the New York City Police Department,
searched for David Felix on information that he had snatched a former
girlfriend’s purse.202 Carter and Matias buzzed the front office of a twentybed supportive housing program run by The Bridge on a weekend night in
plain clothes, while The Bridge building is staffed by a team of one, and
were told that David has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Despite clear
instructions in the NYPD Patrol Guide to officers: “Do not attempt to take
202. The following three paragraphs were published in an op-ed written by the
Author and Marissa Ram for The Guardian. See Brendan M. Conner & Marissa Ram,
David Felix: Jailed by an Unjust System, Failed by City Services, Killed by Police, THE
GUARDIAN,
June
10,
2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/10/david-felix-immigrationmental-illness-killed-by-police.
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[emotionally disturbed persons] into custody without the specific direction
of a supervisor,” and to “attempt to isolate and contain [the person] while
maintaining a zone of safety until arrival of a patrol supervisor and
Emergency Service Unit personnel,” the officers attempted to take David
into custody without supervision or more skilled assistance.203 The
detectives told the staff member that she could not call a supervisor for
approval to let them in, pushed through her protests, and headed up to the
sixth floor. It was not reported whether the detectives presented a valid
arrest warrant to enter David’s building, let alone his apartment, in which
he was a legal tenant, or whether the staff was threatened with arrest if they
did not comply.
As detectives entered the room, David yelled “I’m not going!” and fled
down the fire escape. Again, in violation of the Patrol Guide, the officers
failed to simply contain him until help arrived, instead intercepted him as
he attempted to reenter the building from the courtyard. Nameless police
officials then described the ensuing scuffle like ring announcers in an illfated boxing match, emphasizing its “brutality,” using words like “ripped”
and “bash” and repeatedly describing it as a “melee” and “battle.”204
David, at twenty-four years-old and 5’10” was said to have wielded a .7pound VX-800 police radio, which a former detective was quoted as stating
it was “like getting hit with a brick.”205 The fact that a brick is five times a
police radio’s weight and made of concrete was never mentioned. Rather
than follow the clearly stated NYPD policy that “[d]eadly force will be
used ONLY as a last resort” in such circumstances, Carter turned to it as a
first resort rather than utilizing a less-than-lethal weapon such as a Taser or
pepper spray.206
On May 12, 2015, the City Council held an oversight hearing concerning
the Mayor’s action plan on mental health and the criminal justice system.207
One of the key components of the Mayor’s plan is the dramatic expansion
of housing programs for people who experience homelessness and mental
health issues, who are “frequent flyers” of encounters with the criminal

203.
204.

Id.
J. David Goodman, Suspect Fatally Shot by Detective in East Village Had
Mental Illness and a Troubled Past, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/nyregion/suspect-fatally-shot-by-detective-ineast-village-had-mental-illness-and-a-troubled-past.html?_r=0.
205. Id.
206. N.Y.P.D. PATROL GUIDE § 216-05 (2010).
207. Luca Marzorati, Council Questions Administration on Mental Health and
Criminal Justice, POLITICO N.Y., May 12, 2015, www.capitalnewyork.com/article/cityhall/2015/05/8567940/council-questions-administration-mental-health-and-criminaljustice.
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legal system, precisely the type of program where David met his death.208
Yet, due to virtually unfettered access, law enforcement agencies create
traumatic and violent interactions with residents in shelters and supportive
housing programs. This was a daily reality for David. These critical
housing programs must be expanded and protected from warrantless
searches and threats, including threats to arrest supportive housing staff
seeking to protect residents with mental health diagnoses from potentially
deadly encounters with the police.

208. N.Y.C. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, MAYOR’S TASK FORCE ON BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM—ACTION PLAN: 2014 14 (2015),
www1.nyc.gov/assets/criminaljustice/downloads/pdf/annual-report-complete.pdf.
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